Inferentialism, Title VII, and Legal Concepts
Lee Farnsworth†
We are all textualists now, or so it has been claimed. But textualism, the practice of interpreting statutes solely by reference to their words, is often associated with
conservative judicial outcomes. This is especially true when a focus on statutory text
is combined with the belief that the meanings of words are fixed. This combination
creates a sort of textualist originalism, in which judges interpret statutes in accordance with what the words of a statute meant to the relevant linguistic community at
the time of a statute’s enactment.
In reaction to this conservative interpretive method, rejecting textualism but
keeping an originalist commitment to fixed meanings provides one possible progressive response. Rather than focusing primarily on the statute’s language, one might
instead look to the statute’s animating logic, purpose, or potential to create certain
moral or economic outcomes. But rejecting a focus on statutory text is not the only
progressive response to the originalist textualist. A second approach accepts that the
meanings of statutes derive from text but denies that statutory text has a meaning
that is fixed and unchanging. Often, advocates of this latter approach run into difficulty specifying how and when the meanings of words used in statutes change. And
some might worry that any such account will leave judges too much room to determine that the meanings of a statute’s words have changed, thus enabling judges to
express their policy preferences through the act of statutory interpretation.
This Comment addresses the second approach. It engages with a particular
account in philosophy of language that views meanings as resulting from inferential
connections among concepts. Inferentialism suggests that we can think of these inferential connections as constitutive of meaning and thus think of meaning as in a
real sense responsive to the on-the-ground effects of using a particular word. As those
effects change, as new inferential connections are recognized, so too change the
meanings of words. This Comment argues that this repeated process of changed inferential significance provides us with an account of dynamic meaning that judges
can take notice of but not impose themselves upon. It thus provides a methodology
through which judges can read statutory text to mean something new or different
without thereby merely expressing a political preference.
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INTRODUCTION
Of all the things that judges do, central to those activities is
saying what the law is, which means saying what the words in
statutes mean. “This is a pure question of statutory interpretation
and thus well within the judiciary’s competence.”1 So asserts
Chief Judge Diane Wood in Hively v Ivy Tech Community College
of Indiana,2 in which the en banc Seventh Circuit decided that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is sex discrimination. Courts that have considered the sex discrimination issue
widely agree that the heart of the matter is what the words of
Title VII3 of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 mean. While such an
assessment of meaning may be “well within the judiciary’s competence,” it is also true that, as Wood notes in her very next sentence, “[m]uch ink has been spilled about the proper way to go
about the task of statutory interpretation.”5
This Comment engages with that normative question. Specifically, it suggests that one place we can look for clues about what
judges should do when asking what words mean is to philosophy
of language, which provides generalizable theories about how
concepts become meaningful at all. Semantic theory attempts to

1

Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F3d 339, 343 (7th Cir 2017).
853 F3d 339 (7th Cir 2017).
3
42 USC § 2000e-2(a). The text of Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1), 2(a)(2).
4
Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
5
Hively, 853 F3d at 343.
2

2018]

Inferentialism, Title VII, and Legal Concepts

1777

provide an account of meaning generally by telling a story about
how symbols or sounds can be thought to have content and used
to communicate, what that communication entails, and how communication is achieved by human language users.
This Comment puts legal writing about language in conversation with a certain kind of philosophical thought about semantics. This Comment proceeds in four Parts: In Part I, this
Comment (briefly) surveys interpretive theories animating judicial approaches to statutory interpretation. Part II engages with
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Title VII’s language as an
example of those approaches. In Part III, this Comment develops
a semantics not explicitly considered in those debates: the inferentialism of Professor Robert Brandom. In Part IV, having
sketched the basic components of an inferentialist understanding,
this Comment argues that such an understanding is in tension
with the originalist and dynamic “judicial interpretive” arguments Parts I and II consider and that various attempts at reconciliation are unsatisfactory.
This Comment argues that Brandomian inferentialism gives
us reasons to think differently about statutory interpretation in a
few ways: The framework rejects the dualism of making/finding
in interpretive activity. It rejects the idea that meanings are fixed
as a matter of semantic necessity. Most importantly, it suggests
a certain kind of semantic externalism according to which
language users’ grasp of concepts is not coextensive with the
concepts’ full inferential reach. This Comment suggests that
Brandomian inferentialism gives us powerful reasons to think
that originalist, meaning-as-fixed theories of statutory
interpretation must be incomplete and that there is a principled
understanding of dynamic interpretation that does not merely
reduce to a covert exercise of judicial lawmaking. Furthermore, to
the extent that existing theories of statutory interpretation give
us reason to think that the process of interpretation is
meaningfully “dynamic”—taking account of evolving legal and
social context—Brandom’s more general semantics puts some
meat on those theoretical bones.6
6

Brandom himself suggests as much:
It is clear that this model is getting at something important about case law (and
about common law, which is case law all the way down). . . . [But t]he model
itself provides no more than a portmanteau formulation; it sketches only the
form of an account. . . . Important points are being made, but what is offered is
hardly a theory—it is more like a set of reminders of questions to ask.
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I. INTERPRETING, GENERALLY
Here are two ways of thinking about statutory interpretation.
On a first, “originalist” account, the meaning of statutory terms
is fixed.7 Whether by the public understanding of the terms in the
statute at the time of its passage or the intentions of its ratifiers,
originalists believe that statutes have meanings that are largely
static. Originalism thus emphasizes a certain sort of interpretive
passivity. To talk about meaning this way makes it out to be a
sort of archaeological process, an uncovering of what was actually
there in the heads of the legislators or the perfectly average
English speaker at the time of the statute’s passage.8 In this way,
we can understand theories emphasizing original public meaning,
legislative purpose, or legislative intent as broadly originalist in
the sense in which this Comment uses the term, for each understanding implies that meaning is essentially tied to some fixed,
time-bound source.
Robert B. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative
Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in Graham Hubbs and Douglas Lind, eds, Pragmatism, Law, and Language 19, 31 (Routledge 2014) (describing Professor Ronald
Dworkin’s “chain novel” model of judicial decision-making).
While many theories of interpretation (Dworkin’s, Professor William N. Eskridge Jr’s
“Dynamic Interpretation,” etc.) may reject strictly fixed textual meanings, this Comment
argues that Brandomian inferentialism can provide a robust general semantics, of which
dynamic legal semantics is a type. Brandom’s inferentialism also supplies a set of more
general semantic considerations that, this Comment argues, give us philosophical reasons
to prefer this sort of interpretive model rather than provide arguments in the realm of
governmental design, economic analysis, or legal process.
7
This Comment follows Eskridge in calling an approach “originalist” when it “assume[s] that the legislature fixes the meaning of a statute on the date the statute is enacted.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479,
1480 (1987).
8
Professor Brandom calls this model “communication as conveyance.” Robert B.
Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 479
(Harvard 1994):
Communicating is naturally conceived of as conveying something. According to
such a conception, before an episode of communication takes place only the communicating agent possesses what is to be conveyed; after successful communication the recipient possesses it as well. . . . Communication is a way for speaker
and audience to achieve a shared idea.
. . . What the producer of a meaningful performance has initially and what in
the case of successful communication its consumers eventually acquire is something—a content or meaning determining the significance of the remark—that
is understood by both parties.
In Part IV, this model of communication as conveyance is contrasted with Brandomian
inferentialism, which does not require that inferential significance be preserved in
communication.
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On a second, “dynamic” account, statutory meaning is not
static but instead changes with changes in society or the interpretive community. Rather than pegging the meaning of statutory
terms to a common understanding or set of purposes at a specific
point in time, a dynamic account, as this Comment understands
it, allows for the possibility of meanings that change or evolve because of changing or evolving facts or beliefs. While a purposivist
originalist may advocate for a certain kind of statutory evolution
to best serve the original purposes of a statute in the current context, dynamic interpretation allows for statutory evolution that is
not tied to any fixed point of reference.
A.

Originalist Interpretation

Originalist theories of interpretation exist in many forms, but
this Comment defines originalism as reliance on static meanings.
A first originalist approach sees statutory meanings as fixed by
reference to the “original public meaning” of the terms in the statute as commonly understood at the time of the statute’s ratification.9 A second approach, “purposivism” (sometimes called intentionalism) also emphasizes fixedness and attempts to read
statutes to be consistent with the actual or presumed intentions
(or animating purposes) of the people who passed them.10
Each approach has adherents on the Supreme Court, but the
unifying feature is a belief that law should be interpreted to preserve stability of legal meanings. The late archoriginalist Justice
Antonin Scalia, for example, writes in Roper v Simmons:11 “In a
system based upon constitutional and statutory text democratically adopted, the concept of ‘law’ ordinarily signifies that particular words have a fixed meaning. Such law does not change, and
this Court’s pronouncement of it therefore remains authoritative
9
See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U L Rev 226, 230 (1988). See also
generally, Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 26 Const
Commen 71 (2016).
10 See Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 Tulane L Rev 1, 6–13 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1, 32–39 (1985) (applying a
purposivist approach to the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation). This
Comment uses “purposivism” broadly to refer to a focus on explicit intentions or a more
general underlying purpose—though they are distinguishable. That distinction, however,
does not result in either approach not being “originalist,” as this Comment understands
the term, and thus I generally elide the distinction between the original public meaning
and purposivism approaches.
11 543 US 551 (2005).
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until (confessing our prior error) we overrule.”12 In disputing the
majority’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
on “cruel and unusual” punishment, Scalia criticizes the majority
for “purport[ing] to make of the Eighth Amendment [ ] a mirror
of the passing and changing sentiment.”13 Scalia would instead
have the Court look to “the original meaning of the Eighth
Amendment,” advocating for reasoning about the amendment
that is fettered to the understanding that obtained at the time of
its enactment.14
One asserted benefit of originalism, as Scalia’s opinion in
Roper argues, is that it removes the individual preferences of specific judges from legal interpretation. Indeed, whenever statutory
or constitutional text is read to command a new or different result, the originalist desire for stable and constant meanings often
emerges. Chief Justice John Roberts, in his dissenting opinion in
Obergefell v Hodges,15 mounts similar criticism of the majority’s
reasoning about marriage as a fundamental right, alleging that
“[f]ive lawyers have . . . enacted their own vision of marriage as a
matter of constitutional law.”16 Roberts criticizes the majority
opinion as “an act of will, not legal judgment . . . based not on
neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own ‘understanding of what freedom is and must become.’” 17 A healthy respect for fixed meanings, by contrast, acts as a constraint on
judges who are merely discovering the meaning accepted at the
time of enactment rather than imposing their own preferences on
the text.
Purposivism, too, proceeds by looking backward to something
fixed: the explicit or underlying intentions or purposes of the legislators that enacted a statute. And while interpretation based on
underlying purposes has been used to justify an updated understanding of statutory text (because those underlying purposes
may be served differently in different circumstances), the interpreter must still uncover a fixed underlying purpose and interpret
by reference to that stable point.18
12

Id at 629 (Scalia dissenting).
Id.
14 Id at 608 (Scalia dissenting).
15 135 S Ct 2584 (2015).
16 Id at 2612 (Roberts dissenting).
17 Id (quotation marks omitted).
18 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Three Symmetries between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within
Both, 99 Cornell L Rev 685, 704–07 (2014).
13
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This approach also has defenders among the Supreme
Court’s current justices, perhaps most notably Justice Stephen
Breyer. In National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning,19 in
which the Court clarified the extent of the president’s authority
under the Recess Appointment Clause, Breyer can be read as
advancing something like a purposivist approach in his majority
opinion. Breyer rejects reasoning based on the actual intents of
the framers. Noting that “some argue that the Founders would
likely have intended the Clause to apply only to inter-session
recesses,”20 Breyer argues that this is beside the point for statutory interpretation purposes, as “[t]he question is not: Did the
Founders at the time think about intra-session recesses?”21 Rather than focus on what the Founders actually contemplated or
understood, Breyer stresses that the question is whether the
Founders intended that the clause may apply more broadly “to
somewhat changed circumstances.”22 He presents it as dispositive
that “the Framers likely did intend the Clause to apply to a new
circumstance that so clearly falls within its essential purposes.”23
Thus, the issue of statutory interpretation is still being resolved
by reference to something fixed and historical (the supposed unexpressed intentions of the Framers), but the meaning of the
clause need not derive from any actually contemplated intentions
or beliefs of the Framers. Nevertheless, while our understanding
of the meaning of the clause may evolve as new circumstances
cause us to reconsider those preferences, the task of the interpreter is still largely passive.
Originalism implies that meanings are found and not made.
Meanings of statutes are determined by some aspect of the understanding of a fixed group of people at a fixed moment in time. Indeed, Professor Lawrence B. Solum has called this constraint on
interpretive activity the “Fixation Thesis,” which posits in the
context of constitutional interpretation that “the original meaning (‘communicative content’) of the constitutional text is fixed at
the time each provision is framed and ratified.”24 Solum emphasizes that fixation is a semantic fact about the communicative

19

134 S Ct 2550 (2014).
Id at 2564.
21 Id.
22 Id at 2565.
23 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2565.
24 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 6–7 (2015).
20
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content of words: it affects what the words of a statute mean rather than affecting only how those words are used (their pragmatic effect). He explains that the constraint is consistent with a
general “fixation of conventional semantic meaning by linguistic
facts at the time a communication occurs.”25
But even Solum’s fixation thesis admits of “linguistic drift,”
the idea that “[w]ords and phrases acquire new meanings over
time.”26 This change, however, does not affect the meaning of prior
uses of a particular word or phrase—the communicative content
of which “is a function of the meaning at the time the communication was produced.”27 So while the words of a particular statute
might mean something different if enacted at time one as opposed
to time two, the meaning of any particular enacted statute remains fixed at time one.
There is perhaps one caveat to this general rule. Judge Frank
Easterbrook, himself an unapologetic originalist, has contemplated circumstances in which society has drifted so far from the
original meaning of statutory text that it is no longer useful in
judicial reasoning. In this narrow situation, even the originalist
may recognize a need for an active judicial role in shaping statutory meanings.
Words don’t have intrinsic meanings; the significance of an
expression depends on how the interpretive community alive
at the time of the text’s adoption understood those words. The
older the text, the more distant that interpretive community
from our own. At some point the difference [of the linguistic
drift] becomes so great that the meaning is no longer recoverable reliably.28
Still, these sorts of extreme examples are the exception rather
than the rule and presuppose a degree of cultural and linguistic
change not typically seen in the law.29

25

Id at 23.
Id at 17.
27 Id at 17–18.
28 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts xxv (Thomson/West 2012).
29 Solum uses the example of changing meanings of “domestic violence” as a case of
linguistic drift. Solum, 91 Notre Dame L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 24). Others have
discussed the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” as an example, arguing that
“unusual” originally meant “government practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’” or
otherwise innovative but now means something like “different from that which is generally done” or abnormal. See, for example, John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of
26
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Dynamic Interpretation

In contrast to originalist theories of interpretation, dynamic
accounts of interpretation allow for the possibility of change in
statutory meaning. This change applies not just to subsequent
uses of words or phrases (as in originalist linguistic drift) but also
to a given use. That is, while the originalist countenances linguistic drift such that the words in statute X may mean something
different if enacted at time one as opposed to time two (with the
meaning of any particular enacted statute remaining fixed), dynamic interpretation allows for the possibility that the semantic
content of statute X can be different at time two. In other words,
it is not merely that statute X would mean something different if
enacted today but that statute X actually does mean something
different today than it did when ratified.
Dynamic accounts of interpretation, too, exist in many forms.
In Professor William Eskridge’s dynamic interpretation theory,
[S]tatutory interpretation involves the present-day interpreter’s understanding and reconciliation of three different
perspectives, no one of which will always control. These three
perspectives relate to (1) the statutory text, which is the formal focus of interpretation and a constraint on the range of
interpretive options available (textual perspective); (2) the
original legislative expectations surrounding the statute’s
creation, including compromises reached (historical perspective); and (3) the subsequent evolution of the statute and its
present context, especially the ways in which the societal and
legal environment of the statute has materially changed over
time (evolutive perspective).30
While Eskridge’s approach emphasizes a balance among these
three perspectives, he does suggest that “the more striking the
changes in circumstances (changes in public values count more
than factual changes in society), the greater weight the interpreter will give to evolutive considerations.”31
Eskridge emphasizes the importance of the perspective of the
particular interpreter, who must weigh the various sources of
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw U L Rev 1739,
1744–45 (2008).
30 Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 135 U Pa L Rev at 1483 (cited in note 7).
31 Id at 1496. This point evokes former Judge Richard Posner’s emphasis on the
“lengthy interval” required before reinterpretive updating becomes an appealing possibility. See Hively, 853 F3d at 352–53 (Posner concurring).
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statutory meaning, to statutory interpretation. The task “involves
policy choices and discretion by the interpreter over time as she
applies the statute to specific problems and is responsive to the
current, as well as the historical, political culture.”32
But Eskridge’s account focuses on the practical effects, rather
than the semantic content, of dynamic meanings. He writes:
Because statutes have an indefinite life, they apply to fact
situations well into the future. When successive applications
of the statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors,
the statute’s meaning evolves beyond original expectations.
Indeed, sometimes subsequent applications reveal that factual or legal assumptions of the original statute have become
(or were originally) erroneous; then the statute’s meaning often evolves against its original expectations.33
While Eskridge may accurately describe how legal actors’ use of
statutes in legal reasoning or interpreters’ beliefs about statutory
text change over time, Eskridge does not supply a well workedout account of dynamic meaning at the semantic level. This
Comment seeks to tie that account of pragmatic change to a
broader semantic story about how those changes in use imply semantic changes in the communicative content of the statute itself.
Dynamic statutory interpretation could also be thought of as
proceeding incrementally—building on the interpretations and
authoritative decisions that came before, but also shaping the entire body of doctrine so that it best conforms to some moral or rational ideal.34 This view allows meaning to evolve dynamically as
new authoritative decisions are made and our understanding of
closely related concepts gains a new or sharper dimension.
If originalist statutory interpretation understands meanings
as found, this sort of dynamic approach understands meanings as

32

William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 48 (Harvard 1994).
Id at 49.
34 This could include, for example, Dworkin’s “law as integrity” approach, which allows judges to identify principles that fit with law’s institutional history and to select the
principle(s) that provide the best moral justification for that institutional history. See
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 190–92 (Harvard 1986). One could similarly characterize
efficiency maximizing versions of law and economics, but there the judge’s task is to minimize cost rather than maximize moral appeal. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex L Rev 1581, 1589–92 (discussing
the efficiency implications of different strategies for interpreting contracts).
33
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unapologetically made—though perhaps by reference to some guiding standards. Dynamic interpretation involves not “extract[ing]”
meanings but “giving a fresh meaning to a statement.”35
But there is a “specter of skepticism” that haunts the notion
of a dynamic statutory interpretation.36 For we might worry that
any purported change in the meaning of a statute (for example,
for asserted morality- or efficiency-promoting reasons) is really
nothing more than a dressed-up assertion of judicial power. The
debate over the meaning of Title VII prompts the more general
question of whether dynamic approaches to statutory interpretation must reduce to “overt or covert” judicial interpretive updating—an “entirely judge-made” meaning37 that is unresponsive to
legal reasons characteristic of proper judicial activity.
II. AN INTERPRETIVE CASE STUDY: “SEX DISCRIMINATION”
There are two ways of thinking about the meaning of the
phrase “sex discrimination.” On a first, narrow account, “sex discrimination” refers only to discrimination on the basis of biological sex—that is, on the basis of reproductive functions. According
to the narrow account, sex discrimination occurs when an individual is discriminated against solely because of the biological sex of
the individual. If the discrimination occurs “against women because they are women [or] against men because they are men,”38

35

Hively, 853 F3d at 352 (Posner concurring).
Brandom, discussing the importance of semantics to legal reasoning, explains that
semantically indeterminate legal concepts undercut the ability of law to serve as a source
of rational justification. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 20
(cited in note 6):
36

It is essential to the normative bindingness of applications of legal concepts to
particular cases that those applications can be rationally licensed by laws articulated by those concepts. Insofar as legal concepts are (whether for global, systematic reasons or local, contingent ones) semantically indeterminate in a way
that precludes their functioning appropriately in justifications of legal decisions,
one would be obliged to adopt a form of legal realism about those decisions that
is indistinguishable from legal nihilism. For the idea that there is a difference
between exercising normative authority by appeal to law and simply exercising
power in its name depends on the possibility of distinguishing applications of
the law that are rationally justifiable in virtue of the meanings of the concepts
that articulate the law and those that are not.
We might worry that some forms of dynamic interpretation provide just such a local, contingent source of semantic indeterminacy that leads merely to “exercising power in [law’s]
name” in the way that Brandom identifies. Id.
37 Hively, 853 F3d at 360, 373 (Sykes dissenting).
38 Ulane v Eastern Airlines, Inc, 742 F2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir 1984). The court uses
“women” to refer to females and “men” to refer to males.
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rather than at some other level of descriptive specificity, then we
have a case of sex discrimination on the narrow understanding.
On a second, broader account, “sex discrimination” refers to
a general class of discriminatory behavior that includes discrimination on the basis of reproductive functions and also certain associated concepts and behaviors. According to the broader account, sex discrimination is best thought of as a genus of
discriminatory activity that comprises several species. Even if
discrimination “against women because they are women [or]
against men because they are men”39 came first in the evolutionary lineage of the concept, there are now related forms of discrimination that count as sex discrimination, including discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.
The goal of this Part is to understand how courts have analyzed and understood “sex discrimination” as it relates to Title VII.
To that end, this Part begins by briefly summarizing some of the
Title VII cases in order to reject a broader understanding of “sex
discrimination.” This Part then examines Hively as an example of
various approaches to statutory interpretation in action.
A.

“Sex Discrimination” and Title VII, Historically

From the 1970s to the present, circuit courts have considered
whether and how discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation fits within Title VII. The Supreme Court first recognized an
enlarged understanding of “sex discrimination” in Price
Waterhouse v Hopkins.40 There, a woman brought a retaliation
claim, alleging she had been denied partnership because she
failed to conform to stereotypical expectations of female behavior.41 The Court found the claim cognizable under Title VII, recognizing that traditional sex discrimination includes discriminating
against an individual who fails to adhere to gender stereotypes.42
The Court reasoned that Title VII clearly made gender an “impermissible motive” in adverse treatment and that, “[i]n the specific
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of
a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not
be, has acted on the basis of gender.”43

39
40
41
42
43

Id.
490 US 228 (1989).
Id at 235–37.
Id at 250.
Id.

2018]

Inferentialism, Title VII, and Legal Concepts

1787

After the Price Waterhouse decision, circuit courts attempted
to walk a fine line: the only way those with gender variance or
homosexual orientation can have an actionable claim is when
they are stereotyped on the basis of sex. Thus, gay and lesbian
employees “may nonetheless bring suit when discriminated
against on the basis of [stereotypes of] his or her sex.”44 The nearuniversal adoption of this approach among circuits sets the stage
for Hively.
B.

Interpretive Approaches in Hively

In April 2017, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Title VII
protects employees from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.45 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit interpreted
discrimination on the basis of “sex” in the statute’s language to
include sexual orientation discrimination: “[W]e conclude today
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of
sex discrimination.”46
Kimberly Hively, a part-time adjunct faculty member at a
community college in Indiana, claimed that the college did not renew her contract because she identified as a lesbian.47 Hively sued
her former employer, claiming that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is prohibited under Title VII as discrimination
“on the basis of . . . sex.”48 Consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, that claim was initially dismissed49 before the court agreed
to rehear the case en banc to reconsider the status of sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII.50
1. The majority opinion.
Chief Judge Wood’s majority opinion for the en banc court
presents the issue as one of statutory interpretation. The opinion
considers two lines of argument: first, using “the tried-and-true
comparative method in which we attempt to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision”; and second,

44

Doe v City of Belleville, 119 F3d 563, 593 (7th Cir 1997).
Hively, 853 F3d at 340–41.
46 Id at 341.
47 Id.
48 Id at 340, citing 42 USC § 2000e-2(a).
49 Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 2015 WL 926015, *3 (ND Ind).
See also Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 830 F3d 698, 699 (7th Cir 2016)
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of Hively’s claim).
50 Hively, 853 F3d at 343.
45
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an argument concerning a right to intimate association relying on
Loving v Virginia51 and its progeny.52
Wood’s discussion of the comparative method analysis begins
with the assertion that, if Hively had been a man married to a
woman rather than a woman married to a woman, her employer’s
actions would have been different.53 Thus, because the employer
would treat a man married to a woman differently than Hively (a
woman married to a woman), the employer has engaged in discrimination because of sex. But the dissent criticized this approach on the grounds that it actually conflates two variables in
the comparison: sex and sexual orientation.54 The majority responds that such a criticism “begs th[e] question” because it assumes that consideration of sexual orientation is separable from
pure sex discrimination, which was precisely the question before
the court.55 But because consideration of sexual orientation discrimination requires the court to know the sex of the plaintiff, it
is not clear that sexual orientation discrimination can be neatly
separated from pure sex discrimination in this way.56 The majority also responds by noting that gender stereotyping was ruled
impermissible under Title VII in Price Waterhouse and argues
that “Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to
the female stereotype.”57
The majority also pursues a line of argument based on the
right to intimate association and Loving. The logic is that, just as
discrimination against employees for associating with a person of
a different race is illegal under Title VII, so too is discrimination
against employees for associating intimately with a person of a
specific sex.58 The majority notes that the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Loving helps us understand that miscegenation laws “are (and
always were) inherently racist.”59 The majority claims that this
insight applies to the sexual orientation claim at issue in Hively.60
51

388 US 1 (1967).
Hively, 853 F3d at 345.
53 See id at 346–47.
54 Id at 365–67 (Sykes dissenting).
55 Id at 347.
56 Hively, 853 F3d at 350 (“It would require considerable calisthenics to remove ‘sex’
from ‘sexual orientation.’”).
57 Id at 346.
58 Id at 347–49.
59 Id at 348. Wood’s assertion that miscegenation laws “always were” racist previews
the semantic externalism arguments discussed below. See note 113 and accompanying
text.
60 Hively, 853 F3d at 349.
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In both lines of argument, the majority relies on methods of
statutory interpretation that trace out the implications of other
authoritative, precedential reasoning and that attempt to harmonize the inferential consequences of that reasoning with the present case. This tracing of a controlling, rational, precedential
story through the case law is meant to undergird the court’s application of similar principles in the instant case.
2. The Posner concurrence.
In a notable concurrence, former Judge Richard Posner proposes a different interpretive tack, which he suggests “may be
more straightforward.”61 Posner asserts that statutory interpretation “comes in three flavors”: the “extraction of the original
meaning,” “interpretation by unexpressed intent,” and “giving a
fresh meaning to a statement.”62 Posner claims that the first of
these options, “extraction,” “corresponds to interpretation in ordinary discourse.”63 The second mode, “interpretation by unexpressed intent” is discussed by reference to cases in which the
meaning of a statement is informed by knowledge of the consequences desired by the speaker.64 To use William Blackstone’s example, “whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished
with the utmost severity” is understood not to apply to surgeons
aiding the sick.65 And finally, the third of Posner’s flavors, “giving
a fresh meaning to a statement,” is discussed in relation to
Hively.66 Posner explains, “Statutes and constitutional provisions
frequently are interpreted on the basis of present need and present understanding rather than original meaning.”67 Posner advocates for deciding Hively by appealing to this interpretive technique of “judicial interpretive updating.”68 Posner questions the
majority’s argument that sex discrimination can encompass

61

Id at 352 (Posner concurring).
Id. The first two of these flavors, “extraction of original meaning” and “interpretation by unexpressed intent,” more or less correspond to the types of originalism developed
above in Parts I.A and I.B, respectively.
63 Id at 352 (Posner concurring).
64 Hively, 853 F3d at 352.
65 Id, citing William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 60
(Chicago 1979).
66 Hively, 853 F3d at 352 (Posner concurring).
67 Id.
68 Id at 353.
62
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation absent such updating given that “sex” as understood at the adoption of Title VII
meant biological sex, not sexual orientation.69
Posner, too, mentions some changed circumstances that warrant updating the court’s understanding of the meaning of
Title VII. He cites to Obergefell v Hodges,70 in which the Supreme
Court held that there is a fundamental right to marry and referred to changing biological and social understandings of homosexuality. Toward the end of his concurrence, he writes:
The most tenable and straightforward ground for deciding in
favor of Hively is that while in 1964 sex discrimination meant
discrimination against men or women as such and not
against subsets of men or women such as effeminate men or
mannish women, the concept of sex discrimination has since
broadened.71
3. The Sykes dissent.
Finally, Hively features a dissent written by Judge Diane
Sykes in the style of original public meaning originalism. Sykes
agrees that the issue before the court is “one of statutory interpretation,” and she begins her opinion by stressing the logic
grounding her originalist approach:
When we assume the power to alter the original public meaning of a statute through the process of interpretation, we assume a power that is not ours. The Constitution assigns the
power to make and amend statutory law to the elected representatives of the people. However welcome today’s decision
might be as a policy matter, it comes at a great cost to representative self-government.72
Sykes’s originalism also stresses the fixation thesis: Sykes is
interested in what “a reasonable person competent in the English
language would have understood” Title VII’s language to mean
and cites to public, general use dictionaries’ definitions of “sex” to
make her interpretive case.73 The meaning of Title VII is inseparable, on Sykes’s view, from this archaeological question of the

69
70
71
72
73

Id.
135 S Ct 2584 (2015).
Hively, 853 F3d at 356 (Posner concurring).
Id at 360 (Sykes dissenting).
Id at 362–63.
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meaning of the words at the time of enactment. Sykes further emphasizes that the meaning of Title VII’s statutory terms are fixed
by “public” meanings.74 There are two ways in which this is true:
meaning is fixed by reference to a member of the public’s understanding, and the statutory concept itself (“sex”) is public rather
than narrowly specialized.
***
The opinions in Hively exemplify the legal world’s grappling
with various approaches to interpreting the meaning of “sex
discrimination.” Proponents of the broader meaning of sex
discrimination tend to advance versions of the arguments made
by Wood, emphasizing cultural and legal shifts since the adoption
of Title VII in 1964 that inform the reading of the statute’s text
and suggest that refusing to make sexual orientation
discrimination cognizable under Title VII is inconsistent with
Price Waterhouse, Loving, and Obergefell.75 Those who favor a
narrow reading tend to coalesce around an originalist
understanding that focuses on statutory meaning as fixed at the
time of adoption and emphasizes the common public
understanding of “sex.”76 Further, advocates of the originalist
position may, as Sykes did, point to Posner’s concurrence in
Hively to argue that, if judges endorsing a broader understanding
of sex discrimination are intellectually honest, they must admit
to impermissibly rewriting Title VII as they see fit.77
III. BRANDOMIAN INFERENTIALISM
Here are two ways of thinking about meaning.78 On a first,
representationalist account, a sentence’s meaning is explained by
the conditions under which it is true. This account takes truth,
along with a notion of reference, as semantic primitives. What
words do, according to the representationalist, is represent. That

74

Id at 362.
See, for example, Matthew W. Green Jr, Same-Sex Sex and Immutable Traits: Why
Obergefell v. Hodges Clears a Path to Protecting Gay and Lesbian Employees from Workplace Discrimination under Title VII, 20 J Gender, Race & Just 1, 36–39 (2017).
76 See generally, for example, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Inc, No 15-3775 (2d Cir filed July 26, 2017) (making similar arguments
in favor of a narrow understanding of “sex discrimination”).
77 See note 36 and accompanying text.
78 “There, then, are two ways of thinking about various things.” Richard Rorty, Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida, 39 New Lit Hist 101, 103 (2008).
75

1792

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1775

is, they stand in for parts of the world. Words can be combined
such that they represent the world truly. That is, they get the
parts of the world that they represent correct in some way.79 For
the representationalist, reference and truth are primitive in that
they name the basic or fundamental aspects of the linguistic enterprise—elements not themselves analyzable in yet more fundamental parts.80
On a second, inferentialist account, a sentence’s meaning is
explained by the inferential relationships that obtain between
that sentence and other sentences in the language. One way to
motivate such an account, pursued by Professor Brandom, is to
adopt a pragmatic approach—taking as basic an account of the
act of asserting in order to explain what has thereby been asserted.81 Explanatory priority is given to pragmatics over semantics. The act of making a claim is rational—that is, takes place
within the space of reasons82—if it includes appreciation of at
least some of the inferential consequences associated with the act
of claiming. The functional role of a sentence is thus normatively
defined—asserting the sentence implies a certain responsibility
on the part of the asserting subject according to norms of material
inference. What is primitive, on this account, is not reference and
truth but inference—the basic, necessary ingredient of any rational asserting subject within a language game.83 Reference and
truth emerge from this more basic inferential unit.
The aim of this Part is to understand Brandom as providing
answers to some basic philosophical questions: What is it to be
rational? How do our concepts become contentful? What is the
role of community and society in our discursive activity? These
are, needless to say, extremely broad and contentious questions
with a long history of philosophical and legal thought devoted to
supplying them answers. This Comment’s goal is not to do justice
to the depth of that scholarly tradition. Nor is it to attempt a novel

79

See Jeremy Wanderer, Robert Brandom 96 (McGill-Queen’s 2008).
See generally, for example, Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference (Max Black,
trans), in Peter Geach and Max Black, eds, Translations from the Philosophical Writings
of Gottlob Frege 56 (Basil Blackwell 1960). But see Brandom, Making It Explicit at 94
(cited in note 8) (explaining that, although Gottlob Frege is “usually thought of as the
father of the contemporary way of working out the representationalist order of explanation,” one could “read . . . back into Frege” inferentialist themes).
81 Robert B. Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas 40–41 (Harvard 2009).
82 Id at 10.
83 See id at 95–99 for further discussion of the representationalist and inferentialist
distinction. See also Part III.B, which describes in detail one such language game.
80
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summary of Brandomian inferentialism. Rather, it attempts to
develop some general themes of Brandom’s semantics in order to
see how those themes inform our thought about how words such
as “sex” in Title VII should be understood.
A.

Rationality

To begin, it is helpful to understand what Brandom means by
“rationality” and how he sees us, concept-wielding language
users, as distinctively rational. Brandom identifies Immanuel
Kant’s thought as a tipping point in the history of philosophy because of Kant’s reconceptualization of the category of mental activity and judgment.84 Whereas prior philosophy had been concerned with judgment-as-predication—rational activity as
defined by predication (categorizing objects correctly, understood
as a relational activity)—Brandom reads Kant as understanding
judgment as defined by responsibility (understood as a normative
activity).85 That is, to be rational is not properly understood as
ontological possession of a thing (a mind) that allows one to classify objects but as being responsible to a realm of deontological
assessment.
A rational agent, on this view, is one that is bound by norms.
Rationality involves “committing ourselves . . . [and] making ourselves subject to assessment according to rules that articulate the
contents of those commitments.”86 To be rational, and to wield concepts, critically involves not just knowing what (classifying objects) but also knowing how to do something. To clarify this idea,
Brandom uses the example of a parrot that is trained to respond
differentially to red things by squawking “[t]hat’s red.”87 On the
judgment-as-predication view, being able to reliably differentially
respond to red objects might be thought to be applying the concept
“red.” Not so on a normatively conceived understanding of judgment: the parrot’s behavior does not rise to the level of rational
judgment precisely because it lacks a dimension of normative assessment; the parrot could not offer reasons for its classification.
That is, in order to count as applying the concept “red” under the
Brandomian view, a language user must not only reliably classify

84
85
86
87

Id at 29–33.
Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 33 (cited in note 81).
Id.
Brandom, Making It Explicit at 88 (cited in note 8).
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red things but also be able to make inferences. To make a judgment, a language user must understand the inferential relationships between the concept “red” and other concepts (being “colored,” not compatible with being “green,” etc.).88
Brandom describes this as the difference between “sentience”
and “sapience.”89 Sentience is a biological trait, whereas sapience
involves normative assessment.90 Sapience requires the concept
user to supply reasons for what she does and to submit herself to
assessment in terms of those reasons. Applying concepts, which
is to say “giving and asking for reasons,” characterizes truly sapient discursive activity.91 As Brandom writes,
The space of reasons is the space of concepts. What discursive
beings do is apply concepts. . . . Such discursive activity is the
exercise of a distinctive kind of consciousness. . . . For it depends on the sort of conceptual understanding that consists
in practically knowing one’s way about in the inferentially
articulated space of reasons and concepts, rather than the
sort of organic feeling we share with animals that are not rational animals.92
Brandom characterizes this understanding of judgment as
Kant’s “next big idea” in the history of philosophy: viewing the
normative commitment undertaken through judging as a “task
responsibility” to do something.93 Specifically, Brandom thinks
that we can characterize discursive activity as the undertaking of
commitments—taking on a rational responsibility to provide reasons for one’s actions (justification), to acknowledge inferential
consequences of those reasons (amplification), and to root out incompatibility among commitments undertaken (critical activity).94 A concept user, “a rational self,” can be seen as a web of
interactions among commitments undertaken, which in turn entail and preempt the endorsement of other commitments.95
Brandom, following Kant, refers to this integrative, reweaving,
rational agent as an “original synthetic unity of apperception” and
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Id at 88–89.
Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 135 (cited in note 81).
90 See id.
91 Id at 8.
92 Id at 10.
93 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 35 (cited in note 81) (emphasis omitted). See
also Brandom, Making It Explicit at 172–73 (cited in note 8).
94 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 36 (cited in note 81).
95 See id at 11–14.
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distinguishes the discursive, deontic activity of apperception from
mere labeling, perceptive activity.96
For Brandom then, the paradigm of rational activity is concept application, which involves a responsibility to integrate the
concept into a “constellation” of related concepts connected to
each other inferentially.97
B.

Social Linguistic Activity

This integrative activity extends not just to an individual’s
conceptual commitments but also serves as the foundation for a
general account of linguistic activity. Justification, amplification,
and critical activity all structure the apperceiving individual’s rational activity. Taking this constellation into the interpersonal
realm, shared among language users, provides the basic structure
of Brandom’s linguistic account.
To illustrate, Brandom describes linguistic practice as a certain kind of game.98 Imagine a game with a basic structure that
involves a gameplayer and a scorekeeper. The game involves a
large number of different token types available to be played by
the gameplayer. The gameplayer makes a move by taking one of
the token types and placing it in front of her. Think of this as
undertaking a commitment to that token. This activity is noted
by the scorekeeper, who records the commitments undertaken by
the gameplayer. These commitments can also be disavowed: the
gameplayer does this by removing the relevant token from in
front of her.
Suppose further that various inferential relationships hold
among the tokens. This complicates the job of the scorekeeper, who
notes not only those tokens that the gameplayer has played directly (her commitments), but also keeps track of those tokens that
are permissible and incompatible with the commitments of the
gameplayer. That is, a gameplayer’s playing a token of a given type
will rule out the possibility of legitimately playing some other to-

96 Id at 37. Apperception is the process of integrating a concept or commitment into
the broader constellation of commitments one holds. Brandom emphasizes the “synthetic
unity” of apperception because there is an active synthesis of concepts by the rational
agent that produces a unified web of concepts subject to norms of criticism, amplification,
and justification.
97 Id at 41.
98 This is the heart of Brandom’s inferential account in Making It Explicit. For a
summary, see Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 41–53 (cited in note 79).

1796

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1775

kens—one cannot be committed to the former while also being entitled to play the latter. Further, the scorekeeper can note those
tokens that the gameplayer could play while remaining consistent
with her current commitments. We could think of those tokens as
ones that the gameplayer is entitled to. Entitlement is not a basic
move that the gameplayer can make herself. Instead, entitlements
flow from the more basic commitments that a gameplayer undertakes. Entitlements can be the direct result of a basic commitment
or flow permissively from yet other entitlements. Furthermore, a
gameplayer with commitments judged to be incompatible will correspondingly be judged entitled to neither. A scorekeeper can challenge these commitments, calling on the gameplayer to resolve the
incompatibility or face normative sanction.99
These inferential connections will start to map out the “space
of reasons”100 for an individual gameplayer. But the game as it is
described above is also interpersonal. It involves individual gameplayers keeping score on one another. This perspectival nature101
means that the act of scorekeeping may vary subtly based on the
perspective of the scorekeeper in question and what commitments, entitlements, and incompatibilities she associates with a
given token. Further, gameplayer and scorekeeper are roles each
participant in the game plays at the same time by giving and asking for reasons.
Because gameplayers are also scorekeepers (not only of others, but of themselves, keeping track of their own commitments
and entitlements), the interpersonal act of scorekeeping may have
consequences for the intrapersonal moves one makes as a gameplayer. If one keeps score on a gameplayer, and the player makes
a move to which she is both committed and entitled, and there are

99 For more on challenging, see generally Jeremy Wanderer, Brandom’s Challenges,
in Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, eds, Reading Brandom: On Making It Explicit,
96 (Routledge 2010).
100 Brandom, Making It Explicit at 5 (cited in note 8).
101 The game is “perspectival” in that “it essentially involves a distinction of social
perspective, between what one is doing in acknowledging a commitment (oneself) and attributing a commitment (to someone else).” Robert Brandom, Reply to Allan Gibbard’s
“Thought, Norms, and Discursive Practice”, in Weiss and Wanderer, eds, Reading
Brandom 297, 298 (cited in note 99). The game is thus “social” in what Brandom calls an
“I-thou” sense because of this distinction between the scorekeeping/acknowledgement and
gameplaying/attribution perspective. “I-thou” sociality can be contrasted with “I-we” conceptions of the social, which involve a distinction between an individual and a broader
community. Id at 297–300.
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no incompatible commitments held by the scorekeeper, the scorekeeper gains an entitlement to the claim.102 This is because ascriptions of entitlements always occur from the scorekeeper’s perspective. That is, in tracking a gameplayer’s entitlements and
incompatibilities, the scorekeeper has to rely on her judgment, on
what she takes the inferential consequences of the actual commitments of the gameplayer to be. Crucially, the shape of those
acknowledged relationships will vary from scorekeeper to scorekeeper.103 Indeed, because gameplayers also keep score on themselves, a scorekeeper will likely recognize some consequences of
the tokens she plays but also fail to recognize others.104 The exact
shape of the entitlement and incompatibility consequences that
result from a gameplayer’s tokening will vary depending on the
identity of the specific scorekeeper in question.
C.

Determinateness and Changing Meaning over Time

The story that Brandom tells also seeks to explain what he
calls the “determinateness” of concepts.105 Because the specific
shape of a gameplayer’s commitments (her entitlements and incompatibilities) depends on the judgment of the scorekeeper, we
might start to worry about the move from the actual practices of
scorekeepers to a determinate content that can be associated with
a concept. For one, inferential role is intelligible only when a specific scorekeeper updates the score. For another, regardless of
how many instances of scorekeeping activity there are, they will
underdetermine the number of material inferential consequences
that are appropriately associated with a given tokening.106
The activity of updating the score associated with a given tokening by a gameplayer might differ from scorekeeper to
scorekeeper based on the auxiliary sentences that the scorekeeper

102

See Brandom, Making It Explicit at 185–91 (cited in note 8).
Id at 185.
104 To see this discrepancy, remember that a gameplayer, who keeps score on herself,
will assign to herself some set of entitlements and incompatibilities given her commitments. Her self-assigned set of inferential consequences may not match those assigned
based on other scorekeepers’ standards of correctness. This possibility—that the commitments of a gameplayer entail commitments of which the gameplayer is not herself aware—
will become important for thinking about scorekeeping activity in judging. See note 119–
21 and accompanying text.
105 Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 19 (cited in note 6).
106 See Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 202–06 (cited in note 79) (explaining that
multiple possible understandings of appropriateness could characterize the instances of
scorekeeping).
103
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considers when assigning commitments, entitlements, and incompatibilities. To the extent that two different scorekeepers perform their activities differently in response to a tokening by a
given gameplayer (that is, a concept deployed by a gameplayer),
does the tokening have two different meanings? If it does, we
might worry about the implications for the possibility of communication among participants in the game: if the meaning of a sentence differs based on all of the associated connections between
the sentence and other sentences, then it seems unlikely that any
two people will ever mean the same thing when they use a given
tokening.107
This is one big takeaway from how Brandom says we should
think about meaning: the challenge above seems to want to describe something concrete—a conceptual content—that each participant in the linguistic practice has access to individually.108 But
Brandom says that meanings are not little packets, all alike, to be
copied and distributed to each of the members of a linguistic practice.109 Instead, communication is a social enterprise that succeeds
because each participant in the enterprise does something different. Like partners in a dance, the communication emerges from the
coordinated—but different—activity of the participants.110 While
the partners in communication may not “share” some fixed and determinate thing (a meaning), their interaction counts as successful
communication insofar as they can coordinate their activity together. This type of coordination need not require an exact match
between the inferential consequences of concept application recognized by each scorekeeper/gameplayer.111
Brandom also endorses semantic externalism. What counts as
a correct “move” in the communicative dance depends on standards that are external to the judgment of any individual participant. The gameplayer, when she undertakes a commitment, is
thus meaningfully accountable to normative conceptual standards. Brandom writes:
The norms I am binding myself to by using the term “molybdenum”—what actually follows from or is incompatible with
the applicability of the concept—need not change as my views
about molybdenum and its inferential surround change. And
107
108
109
110
111

See id at 146–47.
Recall “communication as conveyance.” See note 8.
See Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 152–53 (cited in note 79).
See id.
See note 104.
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you and I may be bound by just the same public linguistic and
conceptual norms in the vicinity in spite of the fact that we
are disposed to make different claims and inferential moves.
It is up to me whether I play a token of the “molybdenum”
type in the game of giving and asking for reasons. But it is
not then up to me what the significance of that move is.112
Through this notion of external, public standards of correct
or incorrect application of conceptual norms, Brandom is trying
to carve out a sense in which inferentialism can still be held compatible with a sort of determinate stability. With “molybdenum,”
this sort of objectivity is achieved by making the standards for
correct or incorrect application independent of the views of any
single gameplayer/scorekeeper and resting them instead on an independent expert consensus. In this way, a language user who
employs a given concept can still do so correctly or incorrectly
even if she does not recognize an incorrect application when keeping score on herself.
While the norms structuring a given account of conceptual
content provide a sort of objectivity, those norms can clearly
change and evolve over time. Current participants in the language game can look back on past applications of concepts and
past judgments surrounding inferential consequences and trace
through that history a narrative about the norms that structure
a concept. By acknowledging some applications as correct while
sanctioning others, current participants both make the concepts
in question determinate and find them to be so through their interpretation of past use, knowing that they stand by this history
of concept use just as future generations will stand by them.
Using “copper” as his example, Brandom explains:
A recollective reconstruction of the tradition culminating in
the current set of conceptual commitments-and-contents
shows, from the point of view of that set of commitments-andconcepts, taken as correct, how we gradually, step by step,
came to acknowledge (in our attitudes) the norms (normative
statuses such as commitments) that all along implicitly governed our practices—for instance, what we were really,
whether we knew it or not, committed to about the melting
point of a piece of metal when we applied the concept copper
to it. From this point of view, the contents of our concepts
112 Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism 29
(Harvard 2000).
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have always been perfectly determinate . . . though we didn’t
always know what they were.113
Brandom also makes this point by appealing to a specifically
legal analogy. For, on his view, this social-integrative activity is
exactly the sort of activity undertaken in common-law judging.
Brandom argues that, in the common law, “[a]ll there is to give
[concepts] content is the actual applications that have been made
of them over the years. They are case law all the way down.”114 In
judging a case at common law, the judge has only the precedential
decisions of past common law cases to consult. Those precedents
have shaped concepts relationally, defining the contours of the
applicability of legal concepts by the inferential logical relationships that hold among cases. Brandom describes the process by
saying,
The task in each case is to decide the applicability of some
distinguished legal vocabulary. . . . The judge in each new
case makes a decision, to apply or not to apply the legal concept in question, given the facts of the case. . . . In this process, each new decision, with its accompanying rationale, including a selection of precedents, relevant considerations,
and rules of inference and incompatibility, helps to determine
further the conceptual content of the legal term whose application is up for adjudication.115
The judge in these cases operates in the context of the current
institutional web of permitted legal inferences. The judge’s application of a concept in new circumstances also serves to force the
web to reweave and accommodate the new inferences that follow
from a given application of a concept. It thus helps to shape the
future practices of the legal community that will, in adjudicating
future cases, incorporate the current judgment as precedential.
In this way Brandom sees the rational integration of concepts
as not only socially defined by linguistic communities but historically defined by those communities over time.116 Just as the current members of a community recognize each other as fellow discursive language users, so too they recognize past instantiations

113 Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 36 (cited in note 6)
(emphasis added).
114 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 84 (cited in note 81).
115 Id at 84–85.
116 See Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 33–38 (cited
in note 6).
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of the community as members having something like precedential
authority. To justify the application of a concept is to offer a “rational reconstruction of the tradition that makes it visible as authoritative insofar as, so presented, the tradition at once determines the conceptual content one is adjudicating the application
of and reveals what that content is, and so how the current question of applicability ought to be decided.”117 The entire process of
integrating rational commitments into a “constellation of prior
commitments”118 is based in this sociohistorical process of normative attitudes.
This process implicates “determinateness” in two different
ways: scorekeepers look retrospectively to past uses of concepts to
inform their present judgments but are also aware that present
judgments prospectively affect the norms that will inform future
judgments.119 Brandom emphasizes:
From this point of view, conceptual norms are never fully determinate . . . since there is always room for further determination. The conceptual norms are not completely indeterminate either, since a lot of actual applications have been
endorsed as correct by potentially precedent-setting judgments. All the determinateness the content has is the product of that activity.120
While this may seem to give a sort of privileged authority to the
scorekeeper, this privilege is also administered by future participants in the game. Those participants will also, when keeping
score, have to decide whether to take the judgments of past scorekeepers as authoritative. This is analogous to the fact that the
common-law judge has the authority to determine the current inferential shape of the legal precedent she inherits (though that
determination remains authoritative only if the next judge, when
faced with the same issue, chooses to treat the decision as correct
or precedential). Future scorekeepers have the ability to recast
the judgments made by current scorekeepers as errors or to accept them as correct.121

117
118
119
120

Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 86 (cited in note 81).
Id at 87.
See id at 92–93.
Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 36–37 (cited in

note 6).
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See the discussion below in Part IV.B.
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IV. TOWARD A BRANDOMIAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Comment argues that dynamic interpretive approaches
map well onto Professor Brandom’s semantics. These dynamic approaches to interpretation can countenance broader conceptions
of sex discrimination by acknowledging the inferential pull of cultural attitudes, intervening Supreme Court decisions, and better
understanding of gay and lesbian people’s experiences. This sort
of inferential analysis fits well with a general semantic understanding like Brandom’s that emphasizes meaning as emerging
from dynamic apperceptive activity (deontic scorekeeping). Further, Brandom’s semantics suggests that originalist interpretations undergirding narrow understandings of Title VII are misguided in two ways: First, such understandings improperly focus
on statutory meanings that are found rather than made. Second,
and relatedly, the originalist arguments presented in the debate
surrounding Title VII suggest a rejection of the sort of semantic
externalism typical of Brandom’s thinking. Brandom describes
the process of semantic development as one of discovering those
norms that all along structured our conceptual contents, whether
or not we realized it at the time.122 This is the view that Judge
Posner in Hively derides as “imply[ing] that the statute forbade
discrimination against homosexuals but the framers and ratifiers
of the statute were not smart enough to realize that.”123
To clarify, this Comment seeks to explore the ways in which
a Brandomian understanding of semantics can be used to support
dynamic interpretive methods and to keep at bay concerns about
such methods being unprincipled or mere power plays. That is, it
argues that Brandom’s account gives the dynamic interpreter one
story that she might tell about how the meaning of statutory
terms can change over time. It is beyond the scope of this
Comment to attempt any sort of evaluative or comparative semantics—that is, to argue that Brandom’s semantics is in fact the
best account of language that we currently have and that our interpretive activity should be brought into conformity with
Brandom’s account as a result. Of course, to the extent that is the
case, that provides us with an independent reason to prefer dynamic interpretation to forms of originalism. But even if we are
agnostic as to which semantic account provides us with the best
way of talking about language, Brandomian inferentialism can
122
123
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give us tools to help build up dynamic statutory interpretation
into an internally coherent account with sufficient conceptual resources to respond to various criticisms from originalists and to
give force to some criticisms of its own.
A.

Brandom contra Originalism

At first glance, there appears to be a clear conflict between
the originalist and Brandomian approaches. Originalism emphasizes semantic fixation by appealing to a stable source of conceptual meaning. Brandomian inferentialism, by contrast, emphasizes the pragmatic fluidity of scorekeeping activity—tracking
inferential connections among sentences. What semantics is for,
in other words, is making explicit the normatively enforceable
commitments of a certain group of gameplayers rather than primarily for speaking truly or representing things in a certain way.
Commitment to one sentence by a speaker/gameplayer becomes
meaningful when it is recognized by a scorekeeper who updates
the score accordingly: noting the commitment, permissive entitlements, and incompatibilities that result from the move. Scorekeepers are thereby not conceived of as merely uncovering and
observing those meanings imposed on terms by their speakers (as
in the archaeological originalist account); rather, the activity of
scorekeeping necessarily involves some judgment about inferential consequences that puts the scorekeeper actively at the heart
of semantic content.124
But perhaps a reconciliation is possible. Scorekeeping activity necessarily depends on those auxiliary hypotheses accepted by
the scorekeeper. It is those hypotheses that determine, based on
the acknowledged commitments of a given gameplayer, what the
further committive consequences, entitlements, and incompatibilities associated with a given score will be. Prohibiting commitments that would not have been accepted by an average member
of the linguistic community at the time of a given statute’s adoption may be thought to constrain an originalist judge’s scorekeeping. This is not a necessary feature of judicial interpretive activity—the shape of the judge’s auxiliary commitments could be
otherwise so as to remove this constraint if the judge was not committed to a conservative scorekeeping heuristic. But perhaps we
ought to have this constraint in place for reasons of democratic
government: the constraint improves the publicity of laws, makes
124

See Part III.B.
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law more objective, and ensures that laws’ contents are determined by elected legislators.125
This Comment does not argue that it can never be appropriate to employ these kinds of conservative constraints on scorekeeping activity. Indeed, such a claim would be implausible on its
face. Someone seeking to understand Paul’s epistles, for example
by engaging with concepts like “justification” or “the law” as they
are used in the letters, will surely need to adopt auxiliary scorekeeping hypotheses that recognize only those consequences that
would have been accepted by a Pauline Christian.126 (Keeping
score on Paul’s epistles based on the sort of understanding of “the
law” that includes Title VII, for example, is likely inappropriate.)
There, the biblical scholar really is doing a sort of finding and
adopts some hermeneutics that reflects the desire to uncover the
original meaning of the letter as intended by Paul.
But importantly, note that the scorekeeping constraints
adopted in this sort of conservative interpretation are optional
constraints self-imposed by scorekeepers with a particular goal
(for example, understanding what Paul intended in the epistles).
Such constraints do not run the other way—there is nothing
about the text itself or something external to the scorekeeper that
would force the adoption of a conservative scorekeeping heuristic.
This Comment does not argue that a conservative heuristic might
not also make sense for a certain kind of legal reader; it argues
only that the question of whether it does or not must be answered
at the contested level of utilitarian calculus.
Judge Sykes seems to acknowledge this in her Hively opinion.
She frames originalism as a consequence of a certain kind of ruleof-law concern. She argues that originalism is based in the structure of our democracy and Constitution, which is consistent with
originalism being a contingent, optional approach to legal interpretation.127 But Sykes, despite her initially more utilitarian
framing of the originalist argument, overplays her hand when she
writes of the relevance of the “robust debate” surrounding treatment of gay and lesbian people in society:

125 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 Ave
Maria L Rev 19, 22–24 (2003).
126 See, for example, Romans 5:12–21 (King James Version).
127 See Part II.B.3.
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This striking cultural change informs a case for legislative
change and might eventually persuade the people’s representatives to amend the statute to implement a new public
policy. But it does not bear on the sole inquiry properly before
the en banc court: Is the prevailing interpretation of
Title VII—that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is different in kind and not a form of sex discrimination—
wrong as an original matter?128
For the inferentialist, there is no reason to think that considerations such as original understanding necessarily do not bear on
the question of statutory interpretation before the court. And
that’s because the court’s interpretation is a choice of interpretive
frames, of recognition or nonrecognition of certain auxiliary hypotheses that give the concept “sex discrimination” its inferential
shape. Present cultural attitudes and original public meanings
are both, equally, examples of the sorts of auxiliary hypotheses
that can give our understanding of sex discrimination a particular
inferential shape. There is no way to suppose that one is properly
before the court while the other is off limits without begging the
interpretive question at issue.
Moreover, an originalist heuristic runs counter to the semantic externalism urged by Brandomian inferentialist semantics.
Sykes’s originalism points to democratic legitimacy as an important normative constraint on the scorekeeping activities of
judges. One effect of the adoption of an originalist scorekeeping
heuristic is that the concepts being interpreted are isolated,
meaningfully sealed off from the ordinary public realm of concept
use due to their specialized attendant scorekeeping considerations. I take this to be what happens with something like the exegesis of Paul’s epistles considered earlier: the notions of justification or law employed there are local to the epistles and to a
certain biblical frame of reference. Concepts employed in that context, then, need not be broadly public but instead are specialized.
We can use subscript to denote this sort of local conceptual concern such that someone reading the epistles is interested in
lawPaul rather than “law” as a public concept. Originalist statutory
interpretation, however, is explicitly not confined to the local
realm of legal concepts and judicial interpretation. Originalist

128

Hively, 853 F3d at 361 (Sykes dissenting).
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judges take themselves to be applying public concepts and so cannot confine their concern to the local inferential realm of specialized legal use of the concepts in question.129
The recollective process that Brandom describes with regard
to “molybdenum”130 can equally be applied to Title VII and “sex.”
Just as we historically may not have realized what we were committed to when we applied the concept “molybdenum” (for example, that it entails melting at 4,752 degrees Fahrenheit),131 legislators in the 1960s may not have realized what they were
committing themselves to by outlawing discrimination “on the basis of sex.” But as we gradually came to acknowledge, through
attitudes that treat discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a form of the sort of sex stereotyping that is at the heart
of sex discrimination, the consequences of a commitment not to
discriminate on the basis of sex became clear. In other words, we
can be thought to have made progress in understanding what application of the concept “sex” in Title VII entails, in just the same
way that metallurgical experts’ progress in understanding the
properties of copper entails an evolving set of inferential consequences of application of that concept.
A gameplayer can also count as having made use of a concept
even if she does not grasp or endorse all of the inferential consequences of the concept in question. As Professor Jeremy Wanderer
describes, one can analogize this to playing a game of soccer with
a child.132 A child who merely runs around a soccer field but who
shows no interest in the ball and seems to have absolutely no grasp
of any rules of soccer will not be taken as making any soccerplaying moves. But at some point, even a rudimentary grasp of the
concept of soccer will be judged as soccer playing by observers.133
That is, if the child knows to kick the ball, not to handle it with her
hands, and that the touch lines mark the boundaries of the field,
etc., then the child’s activity can genuinely count as playing soccer.
Furthermore, this is true even if the child does not subjectively endorse all sorts of inferential consequences of soccer playing: that
the ball cannot be passed to a teammate in an offside position, for
example. Observers (scorekeepers) who take the child to be playing

129

See Part I.A.
See notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
131 Molybdenum
(Royal
Society
of
Chemistry,
2017),
http://perma.cc/T3A2-3NY2.
132 See Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 21 (cited in note 79).
133 See id.
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soccer but who themselves have a better knowledge of the rules
and requirements of the game will recognize inferential consequences of the child’s soccer-playing activity that extend beyond
the child’s own grasp of the concept.134 Nevertheless, we can still
think of the child soccer player’s activity as involved in a determinate, objective enterprise of soccer playing.
As Wanderer describes, the child partakes of a concept that
is external to her, with implications that exceed her grasp.135 We
might think that future metallurgical experts, or future legal
scholars, stand in much the same relation to us that the more
soccer-knowledgeable observers stand in to the child soccer
player. From that as-yet-unspecified future perspective, we likely
make mistakes about how we apply the concepts “molybdenum”
or “sex discrimination.” We likely endorse things that we will
come to recognize as wrong and fail to see inferential implications
of those concepts that appear obvious to future observers. But we
can still count as applying, making use of, the same public concepts.136 We need not say that the child soccer player is actually
playing soccerchild while mistakenly being evaluated by reference
to the inferential standards of regulation soccer. But that means
that the inferential consequences of a commitment not to discriminate on the basis of “sex” are similarly not up to us. They evolve
as our perspective changes and as we move from our childlike
grasp of the concepts in question to the perspective of more mature observers.
There is also good reason to think that “sex” as discussed in
originalist judicial opinions on Title VII cannot be a particular
sexlegal, a concept different in kind from our ordinary term “sex.”
Sykes appeals explicitly to “original public meaning” and “common, ordinary usage” and cites to public, nonspecialized dictionaries.137 Posner discusses the “three flavors” of statutory interpretation in connection with “ordinary discourse,” and he concedes

134

See id.
See id.
136 As discussed above, the public concepts in question are not “the same” in the sense
of consisting in a discrete packet of content that is shared by all of the participants in a
conversation. The inferential significance of the concept is necessarily perspectival, but
the norms for evaluating correct or incorrect scorekeeping performances associated with
the public concepts being considered here are, like the norms associated with “molybdenum,” meaningfully external to a particular speaker—part of an already-up-andrunning linguistic practice rather than a narrowly localized one. See notes 107–13 and
accompanying text.
137 Hively, 853 F3d at 360, 362–63 (Sykes dissenting).
135
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that “even today if asked what is the sex of plaintiff Hively one
would answer that she is female or that she is a woman, not that
she is a lesbian.”138 Both Sykes and Posner thus connect their reasoning with ordinary, public understandings of the concept in
question. This sort of appeal to public understandings implies
that our understanding of correct or incorrect application of “sex
discrimination” in Hively ought to follow our general understandings of how that concept becomes contentful. Brandomian inferentialism suggests that “sex discrimination” has content by virtue
of its inferential consequences. If Sykes and Posner meant to apply a more narrowly localized understanding of “sex discrimination” (perhaps one held fixed by originalist scorekeeping heuristic), then their emphasis on ordinary concept use is misplaced. On
a Brandomian understanding, ordinary concepts are ones that
(may) have inferential consequences that exceed our current
grasp of the concept, and thus there is nothing in principle incompatible with our appreciation of the inferential consequences of a
given concept changing over time. Indeed, perhaps the only way
to be sure that a concept’s meaning did not change over time
would be to define it in some narrowly local way, but that approach contrasts with Sykes and Posner’s presentation of their
analysis as ordinary or public.
It is certainly easier to animate a more localized, narrow understanding of the concept in question for a legal issue that involves something that is unambiguously a term of art—like the
discussion of “recess appointments” in Noel Canning.139 There, it
is pretty clear that the game being played, the concept being deployed, was created by and for lawyers engaged in legal reasoning. Because the term is so clearly localized and because it makes
no real claims on broader, more public concepts, it becomes
harder to tell a story about how the true inferential reach of the
concept exceeds the grasp of those who invented and use it. But
it is not impossible to do so. The concept is determined by the inferential connections that link it to other concepts. These connections are clarified through use—actual applications of the concept
and judgments about its use in certain situations as proper or improper. So the meaning of the concept will almost certainly be
clarified and modified as these inferential connections are made
clear. There may be local normative constraints on scorekeeping

138
139

Id at 352–55 (Posner concurring).
See Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2564.
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activity that inform how those judgments are made, but by definition on an inferentialist model the actual meaning of the concept will undergo change as it is applied. Even on this localized
understanding, meaning still emerges from the relationships in
the apperceptive inferential web of concepts—no concept is truly
an island.
Moreover, it is harder to tell this kind of story for Title VII,
whose drafters chose to use concepts like “sex” with very public
meanings and uses rather than to expressly define a legal term of
art. For this reason, a localized legal reading loses force as applied
to Hively in particular.
In sum, Brandom’s inferentialism shares a general affinity
with the sort of dynamic interpretive techniques used to support
broader understandings of sex discrimination. While those
opinions may not draw explicitly on these semantic ideas,
Brandom provides one possible way to tell the dynamic-meaning
story without resorting to “judicial interpretive updating”
rationales. Brandom’s inferentialism also gives us reasons to
think that originalism is not a built-in feature of our activity as
concept users and that, as an optional normative constraint on
scorekeeping activity, it gains force only to the extent that it is a
useful vocabulary for helping us get what we want—in other
words, originalism is swallowed up by a broader pragmatism.
This contrasts with the standard originalist view—that original
public meaning or some similar source of evidence provides a
semantic, as opposed to merely pragmatic, constraint on
interpretive activity.140
Brandom’s philosophy provides us with reasons to think that,
to the extent that law makes use of public concepts, those concepts will evolve in accord with the scorekeeping activity of ordinary concept users. New applications of terms, new judgments
about the correctness or incorrectness of the inferential implications of the concept in question, will affect the meaning of those
concepts that the law deploys. This is also true for local legal
terms of art, but it takes on heightened significance for broader
public concepts given the array of scorekeeping activities that
have the potential to affect those concepts’ inferential role.

140 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Pragmatism’s Role in Interpretation, 31 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 901 (2008).
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Democracy and Constraint

One concern we might have about a Brandomian interpretive
method is how it interacts with democratic values. As Sykes explains in her Hively dissent, we might worry that judicial recognition of a changed statutory meaning is best thought of as legislation from the bench.141 This is why Sykes decries the majority’s
ruling in Hively as (borrowing Posner’s phrase) “[j]udicial statutory updating” that “assume[s] the power to alter the original
public meaning of a statute through the process of interpretation,
[which is] a power that is not [the court’s].”142
But Sykes’s criticism misses the mark as applied to the
Brandomian conception of judicial interpretive activity. What
Sykes criticizes is an activist judiciary, one that actively “updates”
or “rewrites” statutes according to its own preferences. But this
one-sided conception of the Brandomian interpreter is a caricature.
Rather than privileging judicial “making” of the meanings of legal
concepts over Sykes’s preferred “finding,” the Brandomian picture
suggests that this dualism is inadequate—judges (and all scorekeepers) are always both finding the concepts they employ to be
rationally determinate through elaboration of a pattern of appropriate and inappropriate use and making them so through the process of tracing out a recollective reconstruction of the concept’s content. Judges in this picture are still beholden to standards of
correct and incorrect application of concepts that are formally determinate, and those standards are informed by the patterns of licensed and sanctioned application of concepts that the judge recognizes. Judges in this way remain constrained on the Brandomian
picture, but the constraint is exercised by a broader class of information (the recognized web of inferential connections that hold
among legal concepts) than on Sykes’s original public meaning
originalism picture of interpretive activity.
Perhaps the originalist will respond that constraint by the
recognized web of inferential connections that hold among legal
concepts fails to constrain much at all. Indeed, as Part IV.C discusses, the Brandomian account as this Comment understands it
does instruct the judge to look to a much broader class of information than traditional theories of interpretation. But the fundamental point remains that judges on the Brandomian picture are
not actively substituting their own preferred legal concepts for
141
142
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those to be found in the statutes enacted by Congress. Rather,
judges still try to remain faithful to the concepts employed by
Congress while at the same time recognizing that those concepts
are themselves given semantic content by the real-world process
of application by language users. The Brandomian approach here
is no less democratic than the original public meaning originalist’s—neither approach gives special pride of place to the intentions or thoughts of individual democratic actors. In both approaches, the text that is actually enacted controls, regardless of
its democratic popularity.143 But the Brandomian acknowledges
that the concepts employed in statutes, while controlling, are
themselves controlled by actual linguistic activity—the approved
and sanctioned applications of the concept that provide the material from which the Brandomian scorekeeper rationally reconstructs the concept’s meaning. To return to an earlier example,
the Brandomian evaluating the meaning of a child’s playing soccer is bound to recognize that playing soccer entails respecting
the offsides rule regardless of the interpreter’s views on the desirability of such a rule. The public nature of the concept in question
thus works both ways: just as children playing soccer are bound
by offsides whether they acknowledge it or not, so too the scorekeeper evaluating soccer playing is bound to acknowledge the offsides rule as binding. The bindingness of offsides is up to neither
an individual gameplayer nor an individual scorekeeper.
Recognizing the necessity of fidelity to actual concept use is
part of a general shift to a world in which “semantics must answer
to pragmatics”144—where semantics helps make sense of the actual actions of language users. The bedrock of Brandom’s inferentialism is actual linguistic practice: how concepts are actually deployed in language. It is from this actual use of language that we
get the circumstances of correct and incorrect inferential consequences that give inferentialism its force. The web of inferential
connections that is constitutive of inferential meaning is not
static—it does not dictate terms to the use of concepts always and
forever. Rather the web is dynamic, reweaving to accommodate
143 See Part IV.C. Think, for example, of Justice Elena Kagan’s textualist dissent in
Yates v United States, in which she argues that a fish was a “tangible object” even in the
context of a post-Enron corporate responsibility statute. 135 S Ct 1074, 1091 (2015)
(Kagan dissenting). Kagan styles herself as vindicating the true meaning of “tangible
object” and as faithful to the statutory text. See id. A Brandomian can be thought of as
faithful to the text in much the same way but with potentially different views about how
to go about determining the true meaning of “tangible object.”
144 Brandom, Making It Explicit at 83 (cited in note 8).
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the significance of new information supplied by new licensed or
unlicensed deployment of concepts in particular circumstances.
And if this is our model of conceptual change, then judges,
not legislators, are the institutional actors best situated to do the
incremental, sensitive work of tracing out inferential commitments. Such activity, consistent with Brandom’s legal analogy,
looks like the sort of common-law concept elaboration that judges
engage in rather routinely. Sykes, in Hively, wants to draw a line
between “common-law statutes” like the Sherman Act and ordinary judicial work that is “interpretive only.”145 But Brandom’s
general account of conceptual activity suggests that it makes no
sense to attempt to draw such a line: all concepts are to be seen
as responsive to the real-world implications of application to new
circumstances and of changes in what is taken among language
users to be proper and improper use of the concept. The only difference is the speed with which the community applies shifting
norms of correct or incorrect concept application, but the judiciary
remains sensitive to the changing circumstances of application
regardless. That is, it may be that some concepts, as deployed by
language users on the ground, change more quickly than others
in terms of what usages language users recognize as correct or
incorrect, but all semantic content will be sensitive to and shift
along with those on-the-ground changes.
Sykes ends her dissent by asserting that “[t]he court’s new
liability rule is entirely judge-made; it does not derive from the
text of Title VII in any meaningful sense.”146 Applying Brandom,
dynamic statutory interpretation can have it both ways in just the
sense that Sykes denies here. Brandom shows us how to think of
judges as in some sense “making”—actively tracing out a rational
reconstruction that reveals the inferential connections of a concept in question—but also how to think of the meaning that results as faithful to the statutory text. And that occurs because the
statutory text itself, its semantic content, must further be faithful
to the pragmatic doings of the relevant linguistic community. The
applications of the concept in question, the real-world judgments
about proper or improper application, are themselves the fodder
that constitutes the meaning of a concept. And a judge’s careful
attention to the changes in those applications is therefore faithful

145
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to the text in that it recognizes that the text and the concepts it
employs must answer to the world.
When we learn more about “copper” (when we recognize new
consequences of applying the concept “copper”), a scorekeeper’s
inferential accounting of sentences involving the concept will
change to accommodate that progress. So too, when we learn
about a concept like “sex discrimination,” a diligent scorekeeper
will update her books accordingly. Learning more about copper or
sex discrimination is just recognizing new inferential consequences of deploying those concepts, recognizing new applications
of those concepts as appropriate or inappropriate. Thinking of
judges as faithful to text therefore need not mean cutting judges
off from the changing thoughts and behaviors of the very linguistic community whose activity gives concepts their inferential
shape. Legal concepts will not achieve this sort of faithfulness to
the pragmatic doings of individuals all on their own: there is no
self-enforcing mechanism to ensure that changes in how a linguistic community thinks about a concept will be applied in a particular case. That requires the diligent work of a scorekeeper sensitive enough to those changes to recognize them in her own
scorekeeping activity.
C.

“Doing” Brandomian Interpretation

For all their flaws, one of the benefits of the most popular
forms of originalism is that they give relatively clear instructions
to the interpreter. Original public meaning interpretation entails
a discernable task: try to figure out what an individual using a
particular word at a particular point in history is likely to have
meant by it. Purposivism, too, gives the interpreter relatively
clear marching orders: understand the motivating purpose behind a statute and act consistently with that animating spirit.
Brandomian semantics, by contrast, asks the interpreter to
do something much messier and much less amenable to clear instructions: consult and understand the web of permissible and
impermissible inferential connections that obtain among concepts
and apply concepts so as to be consistent with that understanding. There is, consequently, no silver bullet, no magic source to
guide the task of Brandomian interpretation. There is only the
attempt to reason well about concepts and to make a web of concepts cohere with the ways that concepts are actually deployed,
licitly and illicitly, in the world, by language users.

1814

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1775

So if, over the years, we as language users begin to
acknowledge that there is such a thing as workplace sexual
harassment, that women can be attracted to women, that those
same women have a right to marry women, that biases surrounding sexual orientation are just as engrained and pernicious as
other sex or gender stereotypes, and a hundred other, more nuanced things besides, then the base of examples from which the
Brandomian draws her interpretive lessons will have changed.
These changes in how people deploy concepts, and which applications of concepts in which situations they recognize as appropriate, will change the meaning of those concepts themselves. Those
changes give the concept a new inferential shape with which the
Brandomian will try to make her interpretation cohere.
An example may help to clarify. Consider another case related
to how the law affects gay people: Morrissey v United States.147 The
case involves a homosexual male taxpayer who sought to deduct as
medical care expenses the costs related to in vitro fertilization
(IVF).148 Professor Joseph Morrissey, the taxpayer, chose to pursue
the costly IVF treatments because he wanted a child but was unable to conceive one with his chosen partner.149 The case turned on
a matter of statutory interpretation—the correct reading of 26 USC
§ 213(d)’s definition of “medical care” as “amounts paid . . . for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or
for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.”150
The question in the case was whether the IVF treatments were for
the purpose of affecting a “function” of Morrissey’s body.151 The
Eleventh Circuit cited dictionary definitions of key terms,152 looking to the “plain meaning” of the statutory text. It concluded that
the “function” of Morrissey’s sex organs was to produce healthy
sperm.153 Because the IVF treatments did not affect that function,
the deduction was denied.154
For an inferentialist, the scope of this inquiry can be
broadened because the question “What is our best understanding
of what it means for a biological system to have a function?”
admits more nuance and a greater body of evidence than do the
147
148
149
150
151
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153
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871 F3d 1260 (11th Cir 2017).
Id at 1263.
Id.
Id at 1264, citing 26 USC § 213(d).
Morrissey, 871 F3d at 1264–68.
Id at 1265.
Id at 1267.
Id at 1272.
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questions “What do contemporaneous dictionaries define
‘function’ to mean?” or “What does the legislative history reveal
the legislators who passed this statute to have understood
biological ‘function’ to mean?” The relevant question of what
constitutes a “function of the body” may perhaps be informed by
dictionary definitions, but the overarching goal is to apply our
best understanding of the concept “function” in the context of
human biology. For that, we can look not only to dictionary
definitions but also to philosophical and scientific thought that
attempt to systematically describe what it is for a biological
structure to have a “function” or to function properly.155
Furthermore, such robust engagement may indeed compel the
same conclusion reached by the court in Morrissey. But the point
here is to emphasize that interpretation on the Brandomian view
is not reducible to neat and tidy reference to a single type of
evidence. It requires broad engagement with the circumstances of
appropriate application of a concept like “biological function” that
goes beyond definition of “function” from Webster’s. That
engagement is likely to bring in leading work from biology,
philosophy, sociology, or any number of other disciplines that
define the norms of appropriate application of the concepts used
in statutory language.
Here, originalist fears about a lack of constraint on judicial
interpretive activity likely emerge. If interpretation requires such
a broad and varied inquiry, there would seem to be a lot of room
for judges to steer that inquiry toward favored outcomes. But if
we are willing to assume bad faith on the part of judges, then it
seems just as possible to worry that there is room in consultation
of original sources, or of legislative records, for judges to steer
originalist interpretive inquiries in just the same way.156 Of
course, even if judges are not operating in bad faith, they may
nevertheless simply be bad at doing the work of Brandomian inferentialist scorekeeping (or at least worse at the Brandomian in-

155 I refer here principally to the work of philosophers like Professor Ruth Millikan,
who attempts to develop a naturalized account of biological function tied to evolutionarily
selected-for traits. See generally Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other
Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism (MIT 1984). This turns out to be an
extremely complicated question, and full engagement with it is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
156 See generally, for example, Lockhart v United States, 136 S Ct 958 (2016) (featuring application of different originalist statutory techniques in both the majority and dissenting opinions).
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ferentialist task than they are at originalist tasks). But we already ask judges to do all sorts of complicated and varied things
when exercising their judgment or interpreting statutes. Judges’
experience consulting a wide array of evidence ought to give us
comfort that they are up to the task of carefully tracing inferential
consequences among a wide array of concepts in the way that
Brandom’s scorekeeping requires.
The opinions in Obergefell, for example, acknowledge
changed attitudes toward gay and lesbian people in just the way
that inferentialism suggests that they ought to take note of how
concepts are being applied on the ground.157 Judges are also asked
to review cost-benefit analyses,158 evaluate scientific evidence,159
consider psychological claims,160 and confront challenges posed by
advancing technology.161 We also ask judges to evaluate the competing empirical claims of litigants and their amici, who may cite
contradictory or false scholarship.162 It is not clear that asking
judges to do careful historical analysis to identify “original public
meaning”163 is any less demanding than asking judges to carefully
evaluate other sources and the present use of concepts in question. While the task of originalist interpretation may be easier to
state succinctly, it requires substantial and rigorous investigation. Judges are capable of careful and detailed thought about a
given statutory term or legal concept.
This Comment suggests that, consistent with a Brandomian
view, statutory analysis should be directed at sources that go beyond those contemporaneous with a statute’s passage. There may
be a range of relevant evidence to consider when evaluating the
157

See Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2596.
See, for example, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States,
Inc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 53–56 (1983) (evaluating
costs and benefits of seat belt regulations).
159 See, for example, Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579, 592–
93 (1993) (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge . . . must
make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.”).
160 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483, 494 n 11
(1954) (citing to detrimental psychological effects of segregation).
161 See, for example, Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2214–16 (2018).
162 See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 Va L Rev 1757, 1784–
1808 (2014).
163 See, for example, the historical analysis in Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110,
124–27 (1989). If judges are capable of tracing conceptions of the unitary family through
centuries of common-law doctrine, then they are probably capable of taking stock of how
those conceptions stand in the present day.
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present inferential shape of a given concept (such as the subsequent judicial rulings and evolving understanding of sex and gender that motivated the Hively majority’s analysis), and it is difficult in advance of any specific question to identify what sort of
evidence will be relevant to an inquiry about what constitutes the
best modern understanding of a legal concept. Perhaps, then,
Brandomian statutory interpretation would not be easier than
more familiar originalist methods, but any method of statutory
interpretation will require rigor and sophistication of judicial interpreters. What’s more, Brandom’s semantics gives us an account for how a judicial finding of changed statutory meaning can
be more than an unconstrained and unprincipled exercise of
power.
This lack of a user-friendly “method” for Brandomian interpretation is a drawback compared to more familiar interpretive
methods, but I want to close by mentioning one comparative advantage. What Brandomian interpretation lacks in simplicity it
compensates for in hope. Brandom’s semantics gives us a skeleton
on which we can build a meaningfully and rationally dynamic interpretive theory. It grounds dynamic interpretation in such a
way as to keep at bay worries about judges merely “rewriting”
statutes, merely exercising power in law’s name. It tells a story
about how the meanings of statutes respond to changes in the
world. And that story implies that some as-yet unrealized
changes in the behavior of language users (citizens) can force legal concepts into conformity with a web of inferential consequences hitherto unseen. And that means that there is hope for
that future web to be more beautiful and more just than any we
have yet imagined.
CONCLUSION
Law, like all discursive (concept-wielding) activity, must
reckon with semantics. The semantics developed in this Comment
is normative and rational. That normativity is spelled out in
terms of a social, temporal practice of linguistic gameplaying—of
asserting and scorekeeping in communities and through time.
That rationality is elaborated in inferential terms—fundamental
to the account are the inferential consequences that constitute the
space of reasons that give concepts meaning. Thinking about semantics this way yields a view of concepts as dynamic rather than
fixed, containing content that exceeds our grasp of that content,
and created both by the making/authoritative activity of language
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users and the finding/rule-governed administration of that authority by other and future scorekeepers. It gives us a way to
think of Judge Posner’s three flavors not as discrete interpretive
options but potentially as aspects of a broader, multifaceted discursive practice that is the Brandomian inferentialist game of giving and asking for reasons. Judges, like all concept-users, are participants in this game, and this Comment suggests that reasoning
through the structure of that game gives us a new perspective on
their dual role within it.

